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Abstract 
Several studies have explored the application of 
self-generated attitude change model to the reduction 
of phobic affect. Three treatment analogues of 
constrained thought, previously demonstrated to 
attenuate polarized affect, were compared to detemine 
the relative efficacy of process constraint, reality 
constraint, and combined constraint. The effects of 
treatment were assessed with-measures of behavioral 
approach, physiological arousal, subjective fear 
report, self-appraised performance, and subject 
predictions of ability to cope in extralaboratory 
situations. It was predicted that the combined 
condition would provide the most powerful treatment 
analogue but this was not demonstrated. Subjects in 
all conditions improved across all measures, except 
physiological arousal, but not differentially. Several 
possible explanations, alternative theories, and 
remaining research issues are discussed. 
thought constraint comparisons 
3 
Several researchers have demonstrated that thinking 
can exaggerate attitudes about some objects (e.g., 
Leone & Ensley, 1986; Millar & Tesser, 1986; Tesser, 
1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser & Leone, 1977). 
Thinking, in the absence of additional stimuli, can 
cause initially negative attitudes to become more 
negative and initially positive attitudes to become 
more positive. Thought-produced polarization of 
moderate attitudes is called self-generated attitude 
change because no new information is added to the 
cognitive system. The changes must, therefore, be 
intrinsic to the individual's thought process. 
Process 
How does self-contained thought generate attitude 
change? Two mechanisms are involved. First, when 
beliefs are examined during unconstrained thought, they 
may be changed (Leone, 1984). Thought is a creative 
process which manipulates and refines beliefs. It does 
not just review them. Thought serves to organize 
beliefs into a coherent format commonly conceptualized 
as a schema (Tesser, 1978). Additional consistent 
cognitions may be added to the basic set of beliefs, 
thereby strengthing the arguments supporting the 
original attitude (Tesser & Cowan, 1975). Ambiguous 
beliefs may be reconceptualized or reinterpreted to 
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"fit" the dominant belief set (Tesser & Cowan, 1977). 
Incompatible, inconsistent, or competing beliefs may be 
either repressed, minimized, or deleted from the belief 
set. The result of examining relevant beliefs is the 
production of a highly consistent belief set. 
Second, attitudes (ie. affect) and beliefs form a 
dynamic interactive system in which change in either 
produces change in the other. That is, when a belief 
changes, the related attitude will also change 
(McGuire, 1985). Therefore, if attitudes are a 
function of beliefs, thought can polarize attitudes by 
producing a consi-stent set of beliefs.-
Mitigating Factors 
But thinking does not necessarily polarize 
attitudes (Leone & Ensley, 1986). In which situations, 
then, can thinking modify rather than exaggerate 
attitudes? Research offers two such conditions 
reality constraint (Tesser, 1976) and process 
constraint (Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 1978). 
Reality constraint involve thinking in the 
physical presence of an object. Beliefs are sometimes 
distortions of reality. The presence of an object 
allows one to test the "reality" of the beliefs. Based 
on the assumption that people want to be realistic, 
beliefs which are sharply contradicted by the presence 
of the object will be modified to reflect more 
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accurately the physical reality. Permissible beliefs 
are those which are consistent with the reality the 
object has imposed. Reality constraint may limit 
affect by introducing inconsistency into the previously 
defined belief set. 
Process constraint involve a restructuring of 
beliefs by thinking about the derivations of beliefs. 
Unlike reality constraint described above, the physical 
object is not part of process constraint. The target 
of process constraint is the belief system and, in 
particular, its derivation and sources. It is 
suggested that once the belief set is examined 
carefully, irrational and illogical beliefs will be 
obvious. Assuming that people want to be rational, 
irrational thoughts-will be abandoned. Process 
constrained thought attenuates extreme attitudes by 
introducing inconsistency into the existing belief set. 
Clinical Application 
Self-generated attitude change suggests a 
plausible etiology for dysfunctions of affect such as 
phobias and mood disorders. The generally accepted 
etiology for phobias suggests that a person experiences 
a negative response to an otherwise neutral stimulus. 
Further contact with the object or event is avoided. In 
the self generated attitude change conceptualization, 
the attitude towards that object or event polarizes as 
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subsequent thought exaggerates the original negative 
response and reality testing opportunities are avoided. 
Clinically, this would suggest that it is the 
self-contained thought which produces the phobic 
affect. 
If phobias are a special case of thought generated 
attitude polarization, then it seems reasonable that 
whatever attenuates self-generated attitude change 
should also attenuate phobias. In other words, phobic 
affect should be limited or attenuated with thought 
constraints. 
Several studies have explored the efficacy of 
thought constraint in the reduction of phobic affect. 
Tesser, Leone, and Clary (1978) investigated the 
therapeutic implications of Tesser's model by comparing 
unconstrained thought, process constraint, and no 
treatment. Subjects with a public speaking phobia were 
assigned to one of the three treatment conditions. 
Process constraint subjects were asked to think about 
the origins and derivations of their beliefs and fears 
about public speaking. 
"I would like you to relate to me what 
you feel when you must speak in public 
and why you feel this way. What sort of 
emotions and feelings do you experience 
and why? What do you feel--physically--
thought constraint comparisons 
7 
before or during the talk, but more 
importantly, why do you feel this way? 
In terms of your past experience, why do 
you think you may have been 
uncomfortable?" (267) 
Unconstrained thought subjects were asked to think 
about and try to reexperience their emotional reactions 
to public speaking. 
"I would like you to relate to me how 
you feel when you must speak in public; 
what emotions and feelings do you 
experience; how do you feel--physically 
--before or during the speech? How have 
you felt in the past when you were 
confronted with talking in groups, i.e., 
what are your past experiences, in terms 
of emotions and feelings? If you feel 
it would be helpful, try to relive one 
of your past experiences. Also, we are 
not particularly concerned with why you 
feel this way, but how you feel or how 
you have felt when you were to speak in 
public. In short, concentrate on the 
emotional aspect of this experience--how 
do you feel when you must speak in 
public, how have you felt in the past, 
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what are your physical sensations, and 
how did you feel when you were actually 
speaking in public?" (268) 
Control subjects were asked to rate how much difficulty 
they thought most people would experience speaking about 
several topics. Each treatment was evaluated by self 
report, physiological arousal, and peer/experimenter 
observation of behavior indices. The researchers predicted 
that process constraint would attenuate fear, that a 
no-treatment control group would not affect fear, and that 
unconstrained thought would polarize fear. 
The self-report and physiological measures supported 
the predictions. Process constraint subjects reported the 
least fear. Control subjects and unconstrained thought 
subjects reported little change. Palmar sweat indicated the 
lowest level of arousal with process constraint subjects, 
middle level with control subjects, and the highest level 
with unconstrained thought subjects. 
There were, however, no significant differences in the 
results for behavioral measures. The authors suggest that 
the observational rating was not an adequately sensitive 
measure because the peer raters were not trained in 
behavioral observation. For whatever reason, this study 
failed to show a direct relationship between attitude change 
and behavior modification, a necessary component of 
effective therapeutic intervention. 
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Leone and Baldwin (1983) expanded upon the previous 
study in two ways. They examined the effect of combined 
reality and process constraints in reducing phobic reaction 
and they incorporated a valid and reliable behavioral 
measure. In the constrained thought condition, snake phobic 
subjects were exposed to both reality and process 
constraints. The subjects were asked to visually attend to 
a snake while thinking about their fears. Then they were 
asked to explain to the experimenter the beliefs and 
derivations of the beliefs that caused them to fear snakes. 
In the unconstrained thought condition, subjects were asked 
to think about their fear in the absence of the snake. Then 
they were asked to explain to the experimenter their fears, 
feelings, and emotional reactions. The specific instructions 
were similar to those quoted above. The control group 
performed the pretest and posttest with no intervening 
treatment. 
Leone and Baldwin predicted that "a treatment analogue 
that constrained thought-induced changes in belief and 
affect will be relatively effective in ameliorating phobic 
reactions, while a treatment analogue that permits 
unrestricted thought-induced changes in belief and affect 
will be relatively ineffective in reducing phobic reactions 
(p.274) ." Using behavioral and self-report measures, Leone 
and Baldwin demonstrated that, as predicted, thought with 
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dual constraints did attenuate phobic reactions, whereas 
unconstrained thought did not. 
Given that reality and process constraints attenuated 
phobic reaction, Leone, Minor and Baltimore (1983) examined 
the relative effectiveness of treatment. They compared 
Bandura's performance mastery, constrained thought, 
unconstrained thought, and no treatment. They measured 
behavioral approach to a snake for people who expressed a 
strong fear of snakes. 
Subjects in the performance mastery condition were 
asked to approach and handle a snake after the desired 
behavior had been modeled for them. Constrained thought 
condition subjects were asked to think about their beliefs 
for 5 minutes in the presence of a snake. Additionally, the 
subjects were asked to visually attend to the snake while 
thinking about the beliefs. They then explained the 
derivations of those beliefs to the experimenter. 
Unconstrained thought condition subjects were asked to think 
about their feelings and beliefs in the presence of the 
empty snake cage for 5 minutes. Then they were asked to 
talk about their feelings and beliefs with the experimenter. 
The specific instructions for the constrained and 
unconstrained conditions were similar to those in Tesser et 
al. (1978) • A no-treatment or waiting list condition 
comprised the control group. 
thought constraint comparisons 
11 
They predicted that thought with reality and process 
constraints would reduce exaggerated affect, that 
performance accomplishment would reduce affect, and that 
thought in the absence of constraints would increase 
exaggerated affect. Their results supported the 
predictions. Avoidance behavior was reduced the most in the 
performance mastery condition. Avoidance behavior was also 
reduced by constrained thought but remained approximately 
the same in the control condition and marginally increased 
in the unconstrained thought condition. 
In a followup study, Leone (1984) demonstrated a 
linear relationship between constrained thought and-beliefs. 
He predicted that the longer the subjects used constrained 
thought, the stronger they would believe that they could 
cope with the feared object. Conversely, the longer the 
subjects used unconstrained thought, the more strongly they 
believed that they could not cope with the feared object. 
Leone also predicted that the longer the subjects maintained 
eye contact with the feared object during constrained 
thought, the more likely they were to believe they could 
cope with the object. 
In the constrained thought condition, there was a 
strong positive correlation between length of time spent in 
thought and strength of self-perceived coping abilities as 
well as a strong positive correlation between the amount of 
eye contact and the strength of coping beliefs. In the 
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unconstrained condition, there was a strong negative 
correlation between the amount of time spent in thought and 
the strength of the subjects' coping beliefs. 
In summary, the research demonstrates that cognitive 
constraints are effective in reducing exaggerated affect. 
The methods and results of the above studies do not, 
however, use the same treatment conditions. Some utilized 
process constraint while others used combined constraints. 
As a result, we are left with the following questions? What 
is the most effective treatment package? Is the combination 
of constraints more powerful than either component by 
itself? Which component(s) reliably change(s) behaviors, a 
clinical necessity? Further research is necessary to design 
the most parsimonious and powerful treatment protocol. This 
study is designed to explore the relative power of each 
component of thought constraint and the combination of the 
two in treating phobias. 
On an empirical level, it should be noted that in the 
studies using combined constraint a clear and monotonic 
relationship was demonstrated between thought and behavior 
(Leone & Baldwin, 1983). However, this relationship was not 
demonstrated in the study which used process constraint 
alone (Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 1978). This suggests that 
the combination of process and reality constraint is more 
powerful than either alone. 
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Conceptually, it would seem that the use of two 
different types of thought constraint should decrease fear 
more than the use of either alone. That is, as more aspects 
of the belief system are scrutinized (i.e., the reality of 
perception and the derivation of those perceptions), more 
beliefs should be questioned, deleted, or redefined. As 
belief system changes, the attitude towards the feared 
object should become more ambivalent. 
Method 
Subject 
Forty-four subjects were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology, nursing, and education classes (42 females, 2 
males). Subjects were selected from those indicating a 
strong fear of rats. Subject ages ranged from 18 to 55 and 
the average age was 26.4 (SD = 9.7). Subjects were 
scheduled for two individual sessions approximately a week 
apart. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment 
conditions. Subjects received class credit for 
participation. 
Procedure 
Volunteers were screened for participation based upon 
their response to the Geer Fear Survey (see Appendix A). 
Given a list of objects and events which "some people fear", 
subjects were asked to rate their level of fear with a 
Likert-like scale (1, no fear, to 7, terror). Subjects were 
selected from those scoring 5, 6 or 7 on the 7-point Geer 
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Fear Scale (Geer, 1965) indicating a strong fear of rats. 
The survey was administered in a group setting. 
Participants were interviewed individually during a two 
session experiment. In the first session, Experimenter 1 
(E1) introduced herself, her assistant, Experimenter 2 (E2), 
and explained the general rationale (i.e., investigation of 
methods for reducing fear) for the experiment. Three 
assistants were used during the course of the experiments, 
two females and one male. Only one assistant was present at 
any session. Because the study was a double blind design, 
E1 left after the introduction phase while E2 obtained 
informed consent in writing (see Appendix B) and 
administered the pretests. E1 met the subject for the 
second session and randomly assigned people to one of three 
treatment analogue conditions. E1 administered the 
treatments and a relaxation exercise. E2 then came into the 
room to conduct the posttest and El left. El was blind to 
the results of these measures. E2 was blind to the 
treatment condition assigned to each subject. 
Subjects' fear was evaluated in five tests. 
Behavioral Measure. E2 took the subject to a room with 
a laboratory rat confined in a clear plastic cage. 
Behavioral approach was assessed with a graded series of 
approach behavior requests (see Appendix C). The subjects 
were instructed to do only what was reasonably comfortable 
to do as each request was issued. Approach behavior was 
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measured on a 22-point scale as described by Leone and 
Baldwin (1983). A rating of 22 indicates that the subject 
refused to enter the room. A rating of 1 indicates that the 
subject was able to actually touch the feared object. 
Intermediate ratings indicate feet of approach to the rat. 
Numbered strips of masking tape were placed unobtrusively on 
the floor at one foot intervals to facilitate E2's coding of 
approach. 
Physiological Measure. l E2 applied palmar sweat paper 
to the first finger of the subject's non-dominant hand 
(McNair, Droppleman, & Pillard, 1967). The subject wore 
the paper during actual exposure to the feared object for 4 
minutes. The paper was removed after the behavioral 
pretest. Perspiration produces a blue stain on the treated 
paper. Two independent raters sorted samples from all 
SUbjects into five discrete groups based on stain density. 
The faintest stains (indicating the least arousal) were 
rated 1. The densest stains were rated 5. The sorts were 
evaluated statistically to determine interrater reliability. 
Self-Report. Three self-report inventories were 
administered to evaluate fear, performance evaluation, and 
efficacy expectations. Immediately following exposure to the 
feared objects, the subjects were asked to rate their fear 
on a 100-point scale (see Appendix D, part 1). Second, they 
were asked to rate their feelings about their performance on 
the behavioral test on a set of 7-point semantic 
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differential scales (Positive/Negative, Unpleasant/Pleasant, 
Strong/Weak, Bad/Good, Valuable/Worthless, Anxious/Relaxed 
(see Appendix 0, part 2). Subjects were then asked to read 
six vignettes about encountering the feared object in a 
naturalistic setting (e.g., in a pet store, while cleaning 
the attic, on film, in a museum exhibit). They were asked 
to judge their ability to cope with these situations on a 
100-point scale. A score of 1 indicated no coping ability 
expectation and 100 indicated total ability to cope (see 
Appendix 0, part 3). 
Reality constraint condition. In the reality 
-constraint condition, the subjects were asked to think about 
their feelings, thoughts and experiences about rats for 5 
minutes while they were seated near a desk with the caged 
laboratory rat. As a manipulation check, the subjects were 
asked to press a button regulating a stop watch when they 
were thinking about rats and release it when they were not. 
The apparatus was demonstrated prior to bringing the rat 
into the room. It was explained that sometimes people 
experience distracting thoughts when they are trying to 
think about a particular subject. If this happened, the 
subjects were asked to release the button. They were asked 
to press the button when they resumed thinking about their 
feelings. The subjects were asked to visually attend the rat 
while thinking about their beliefs (Leone, 1984). The 
experimenter recorded the presence or absence of eye contact 
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at 20-second interval during the 5 minutes of attention. El 
was seated to the left of the subject at the edge of the 
subjects line of sight where she could observe the subjects' 
eye contact as unobtrusively as possible. 
Process Constraint Condition. In the process constraint 
condition, the subjects were asked to think about their 
thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about rats for 5 minutes. 
In addition, the subjects were asked to focus this thinking 
on the origins and derivations of those feelings and 
beliefs. The instructions were similar to those used by 
Tesser et al. (1978). The subjects were given 5 minutes to 
explain their feelings and beliefs. Subjects' attention was 
focused on the derivation of their beliefs through the use 
of probes (e.g., tell me why you believe that; what do you 
think logically makes you afraid; why do you feel that as 
opposed to something else). 
Process and Reality Constraints Condition. In the dual 
constraints condition, the subjects were asked to think 
about origins and derivations of their beliefs as in the 
process condition for 5 minutes. They also spent 5 minutes 
thinking about their beliefs and feelings with the rat 
present. Half the subjects performed the process constraint 
component first followed by the reality constraint 
component. The other half of the subjects were assigned to 
the reality constraint component first and then the process 
constraint condition. 
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In the reality and process constraint alone 
conditions, the subjects were asked to wait "a few minutes" 
(exactly 5 minutes) before the experiment began while the 
experimenter "got things ready." This manipulation made all 
treatment conditions require approximately the same length 
of time to administer. 
At the end of all treatment conditions, a relaxation 
exercise was administered by El who presented it as "the 
next exercise rId like to ask you to do is ••• " The 
relaxation exercise was provided after each condition to 
ensure that any change between pretest and posttest measures 
is not a result of treatments administered, per see 
Instead, any difference between pretest and posttest should 
be the result of a change in beliefs which, in turn, 
affected performance on the posttest. The relaxation 
exercise consisted of 4 minutes of verbally guided slow, 
deep breathing. 
Posttest. Following each of the treatments, E2 
administered the posttreatment evaluation using the same 
measures as the pretests. After the posttests, subjects 
were debriefed by El. The experiment was described and any 
questions were be answered in accordance with APA 
guidelines. All subjects were asked not to discuss the 
experiment with other students who might be future subjects. 
overview of Design 
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RESULTS 
The independent variable in this study was the treatment 
analogue (process constraint, reality constraint, or 
combined process and reality constraint). The dependent 
variables were behavioral approach, physiological arousal, 
self-reported fear, evaluation of performance, and 
extralaboratory expectations. Each subject produced a set of 
pretest and posttest measures collected approximately one 
wee~ apart. The posttest data was collected immediately 
after a relaxation exercise following the treatment. In the 
reality constraint condition and the reality constraint 
portion of the combined condition, data was collected for 
time spent in thought and eye contact. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all analyses were based on a 3 (treatment 
analogue) x 2 (pretest-posttest) AN OVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor (cf., Huck & McLean, 1975). 
Manipulation Checks 
The analyses of both manipulation checks was based on a 
one-way ANOVA (i.e., reality constraint alone vs. combined 
reality and process constraint). For time spent in thought, 
there was no significant main effect of treatment analogue 
condition, !(1,27) < 1.00. For eye contact, there was no 
significant main effect of treatment analogue condition, 
!(1,27) = 2.45, £ = ns. This indicates that the time spent 
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in thought about the feared object and visual attention to 
the feared object did not differ between conditions. 
Behavioral Approach 
The ANOVA indicated that neither the main effect of 
treatment analogue nor the interaction of treatment analogue 
and pretest-posttest measures were statistically 
significant, all Fs ~ 1.12. There was a reliable main 
effect of pretest-posttest measure K(1,41) = 8.03, E < .01. 
Participants were able to approach the feared object more 
closely after treatment (~ = 3.47) than before treatment (~ 
= 4.72). Mean results are reported on Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Physiological Arousal 2 
Palmar sweat was assessed during the pretest and 
posttest. To score stains, two raters independently sorted 
the samples into five categories of stain density for the 
pretest and posttest, separately. Interrater reliability 
was r = .91 for pretest ratings and r = .89 for posttest 
ratings. Therefore, results were collapsed, separately for 
pretest and posttest, across raters. However, the ANOVA 
revealed no significant main effect for treatment analogue 
condition or any significant interaction between 
pretest-posttest measure and treatment analogue. Mean 
results are reported on Table 2. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
Self-Reported Fear 
The ANOVA indicated that neither the main effect of the 
treatment analogue nor the interaction of the treatment 
analogue and pretest-posttest measures were statistically 
significant, all Fs < 1.02. There was, however, a reliable 
main effect of pretest-posttest, !(1,41) = 23.84, 
£ < .01. Across all treatments, participants reported less 
fear after treatment (~ = 27.20) than before treatment (~ = 
41.29). Mean results are reported on Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Performance Evaluation 
The ANOVA indicated that neither the main effect of the 
treatment analogue nor the interaction of treatment analogue 
and pretest-posttest measures were statistically 
significant, all Fs <1.00. A reliable main effect of 
pretest-posttest measure was obtained, !(1,41) = 5.35, £ < 
.05. Participants' evaluation of their performance was more 
favorable (~ = 23.62) on the posttest measure than on the 
pretest measure (M = 21.42). Mean results are reported on 
Table 4. 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Extralaboratory Expectations 
As on all other measures, the ANOVA revealed no 
statistically significant results for the main effect of 
treatment analogue or for the interaction of treatment 
analogue and pretest-posttest measures, all !s ~1.00. There 
was a reliable main effect for pretest-posttest measure, 
!(1,41) = 26.57, E < .01. Across all treatments, 
participants predicted greater ability to cope with everyday 
situations involving the feared object after treatment (~ = 
268.1) than before treatment (~ = 220.88). Mean results are 
reported on Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
DISCUSSION 
It was predicted that the combined process and reality 
constraint treatment would be more powerful than either 
constraint by itself. In fact, no significant difference 
was found among the treatment conditions. Participants 
across all conditions showed equivalent improvement. The 
improvement between pretest and posttest was consistent 
across all measures except physiological arousal which 
showed no change. Perhaps any thought constraint, 
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regardless of modality, is effective in reducing polarized 
attitudes. In other words, thought constraint might 
attenuate polarized affect whether the feared object is 
physically or mentally present. 
Alternate Explanations of Results 
Alternatively, it may be argued that it was the 
relaxation exercise which produced the observed improvement 
rather than any constraint on thought. The relaxation 
exercise raises two issues. First, the relaxation exercise 
was included between the treatment and the posttest in the 
research design to ensure that any change would be the 
result of belief set change and not a side effect of the 
treatment per see However, relaxation training may alone 
account for a reduction in fear. If so, the physiological 
arousal should be the most sensitive measure of such an 
effect. Yet, arousal was the one measure in which no 
difference was observed between pretest, measured without a 
preceding relaxation exercise, and posttest measured 
immediately following the exercise. 
Second, relaxation could have masked real but weak 
differences among the conditions. A no-treatment control 
condition in which the subjects perform pretest, relaxation 
exercise, and posttest as in the other conditions would be 
helpful in clarifying this issue. If the control subjects 
showed little or no improvement it could be assumed that the 
relaxation exercise was not masking differences. 
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Demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), the desire to 
please the experimenter, must also be considered as an 
explanation for overall improvement in the absence of 
differential change among conditions. The time lapse of 
approximately one week between the pretest and posttest was 
incorporated to make it unlikely that a subject would 
remember previous responses accurately enough to 
deliberately manipulate posttest data. Additionally, fear 
itself should be sufficient to mitigate demand manipulation 
of behavioral or physiological measures. Presumably, one 
would not choose to approach and handle an object of fear 
just to please a stranger. A placebo treatment control 
group could help clarify this issue. 
Another consideration is habituation. The subjects were 
exposed to the object of their fear on two or more 
occasions. If this exposure were a factor, the combined 
condition and the reality condition should have produced a 
significant difference in outcome over the process condition 
because the subject had more exposure to the feared object 
than in the process constraint alone condition. Since there 
is no significant difference in outcome by condition, 
habituation is not a viable explanation for the results 
obtained. 
Finally, the lack of significant difference among 
conditions as predicted could be the result of the small 
number of subjects sampled. By practical necessity, the 
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fears of the subjects were subclinical. Although real and 
valid, the subjects' fears were not so severe as to 
compromise the individuals' work, social, or personal lives 
nor pose a risk to that person or to others. Therefore, 
improvements might be small per subject, requiring a much 
larger sample size to detect significant differences in 
arousal, approach, subjective fear, and extralaboratory 
expectations. 
Theoretical Issues 
Behavioral therapies, including systematic 
desensitization (Wolpe, 1958) and flooding (Rimm & 
Cunningham, 1985) may also appear to offer explanations for 
the results obtained. Indeed, there are similarities. 
However, both the theoretical explanation of the development 
of phobias and the methodology of these therapies are quite 
different from that of self-generated attitude change and 
thought constraint. 
Behavioral therapies assume phobic behaviors are 
acquired through learning (Bandura, 1974). Although three 
mechanisms are often mentioned (operant conditioning, 
classical conditioning, and modeling), classical 
conditioning is the most common explanation for the initial 
acquisition of a phobia (Rimm & Cummingham, 1985). Mowrer 
(1946) and Eysenck (1982) suggest that a second factor is 
essential in explaining the maintenance of phobia. Mowrer's 
two factor theory offers escape or avoidance as the 
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sustaining mechanism while Eysenck theorizes that 
"incubation of fear" is the mechanism that precluded 
extinction of the fear response. 
On the other hand, self-generated attitude change 
theory hypothesizes that fears are acquired through thinking 
about what one believes about the object or event. During 
thought, beliefs about the object become consistent and 
negative. Ambiguous thoughts are redefined and attitude 
polarizes. As beliefs become polarized, fear increases. 
Self-generated attitude change theorists would agree that 
fear is maintained by avoidance. When the feared object or 
event is avoided, there is no opportunity to think about it 
and realize that the fear may be based on vague impressions, 
faulty premises, leaps of logic, or irrational conclusions. 
In practice, behavioral methodologies include systematic 
desensitization (Goldfried, 1971i Wolpe, 1958) and flooding 
(Sheehan, 1982). Wolpe (1958) suggested that systematic 
desensitization provided a substituted emotion (i.e. 
relaxation) for the troublesome emotion (i.e. fear). 
Goldfried (1971) offered an alternative explanation which is 
more prevalent now. He suggested that systematic 
desensitization offerred a coping strategy or mechanism with 
which a person could control fear. 
Systematic desensitization consists of three stages. 
First, the client and therapist compose a graduated list of 
scenes involving the feared object or event. This graduated 
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hierarchy can be imaginal or in vivo but is generally 
imaginal. Next, the client is taught to substitute another 
emotion (i.e. relaxation) for fear. Therefore, a relaxation 
method is introduced and rehearsed. Finally, the hierarchy 
is presented one item at a time as the client practices 
relaxation in the presence of small increments of anxiety 
evoking stimuli (Rimm & Cunningham, 1985). 
Like systematic desensitization, thought constraint can 
be either in vivo or imaginal. In vivo thought constraint 
(i.e. reality constraint) presents the feared object but in 
neither a gradual manner. The subjects are asked to focus 
their thoughts on the object of their fear. The presence 
of the fear object acts as a reality limit to polarizing 
affect. 
Imaginal thought constraint (i.e., process constraint) 
focuses the therapeutic work on the derivations of thoughts, 
feelings, and experiences. Process constraint differs from 
systematic desensitization in that it involves no hierarchy 
of fear, no gradual exposure, and no sUbstitute for feelings 
such as relaxation. Thought constraint is not a substitute 
emotion or a coping skill. It is an examination of a 
salient cognitive set. In examining beliefs the subjects 
test their beliefs. They become aware that some thoughts 
are based on vague impressions, faulty premises, irrational 
beliefs, and leaps of logic. 
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Flooding involves anxiety producing exposure to the 
feared object or event. Flooding can be imaginal or in 
vivo. It is reported to be especially effective in the 
treatment of agoraphobia (Sheehan, 1982). Most studies have 
involved in vivo flooding which is conducted in the natural 
environment with actual stimuli (Rimm & Cunningham, 1985). 
Unlike flooding, reality constraint exposure to the feared 
object does not create or maximize anxiety. It provides a 
thought limiting environment for the examination of belief 
sets and not an exposure to anxiety. 
Cognitive behavioral theorists show greater interest in 
the belief set involved in dysfunctional behavior such as 
phobias. The acquisition of phobic reactions is theorized 
to result from faulty premises on which conclusions are 
based. They are maintained by selective attention (Beck, 
1976; Ellis, 1974; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Michenbaum, 
1985). According to Ellis (1974), a person makes a faulty 
and counterproductive interpretation of the significance of 
an event because of one of eleven characteristic irrational 
beliefs. The person's conception of the situation is more 
important than the objective situation. Treatment involves 
disputing these irrational beliefs (Ellis, 19741 Ellis & 
Grieger, 1977). Perception of the event or perception of 
one's ability to cope with the event are alternative 
cognitive behavioral explanations (Beck, 1976). 
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Theoretical differences between cognitive restructuring 
and self-generated attitude change are more subtle but quite 
real. Self-generated attitude change does not postulate any 
common, ubiquitous underlying faulty irrational beliefs as 
Ellis does. Self-generated attitude change, rather, 
postulates the absence of or lack of salience of all but the 
most negative of beliefs regarding the feared object. In 
addition, the methodology differs. 
For example, Ellis's Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) 
consists primarily of assessing irrational beliefs with a 
Beliefs Inventory and refuting irrational beliefs using his 
A-B-C model. In this model, C is usually the consequences 
which brought the person to therapy, A is the activating 
event which in itself is neutral, and B is the underlying 
belief which acted upon A creating the disturbing C. The 
curative process in this model is D, disputing the 
irrational, underlying belief, and E, eliminating irrational 
ideas. While thought constraint does bring into focus the 
irrational beliefs which are disturbing the person, it 
assumes that the underlying beliefs are idiosyncratic and 
not limited to Ellis' list of eleven. 
Another difference between treatment methods derived 
from self-generated attitude change and cognitive 
restructuring methods involves active responsibility for 
change. While the individual is ultimately responsible for 
change, cognitive restructuring therapy provides ardent, 
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forceful, and directing disputation on the part of the 
therapist to convince, as it were, the client that the 
disruptive beliefs are irrational. In thought constraint, 
the active responsiblity lies with the individual. The 
therapist helps to keep the individuals thoughts focused on 
the belief set but does impose therapist beliefs. 
Cognitive restructuring, including but not limited to 
RET, involves controlling dysfunctional emotions through the 
use of self-observational "homework" which promotes self 
awareness and better understanding. In the second phase of 
treatment, individuals who are guided by the therapist 
develop and rehearse behaviors which are incompatible with 
the problem behaviors. For example, positive 
self-statements may be assigned to help restructure the 
negative cognitions of a person suffering from low 
self-esteem. Finally, the individual is taught to do what 
the therapist has been modeling, to "catch" oneself at the 
self-defeating behaviors, and to incorporate the new 
behaviors (Michenbaum, 1985). 
Treatments developed from self-generated attitude 
change encourage the individual to examine idiosyncratic, 
dysfunctional belief sets and in so doing, recognize vague 
impressions, faulty premises, leaps of logic and irrational 
beliefs related to the phobic reaction. The corrective 
process in treatments derived from self-generated 
attenuation of polarized attitudes is the persons' 
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refutation of their own indiosyncratic beliefs and not the 
refuting of some other set of beliefs or perceptions about 
underlying beliefs. Better understanding, self-statements, 
and self-instruction are not included in the self-generated 
attitude change model. A change in belief set does not 
require insight. It requires ambivalence and discomfort 
with irrational beliefs. 
Remaining Issues 
Finally, there is interest in both a detailed clinical 
protocol and in how individual differences effect modal 
efficacy. While it is evident that thought constraint does 
reduce phobic attitude polarization, a therapeutic protocol 
remains to be designed and tested. The length of exposure 
to thought constraint was 5 minutes. Is this sufficient for 
maximum benefit or should the exposure be 10 or 15 minutes 
per session? One session was used in the study. How many 
sessions are required to produce and sustain best results? 
Should the sessions be conducted weekly, bi-weekly, 
semi-weekly? Should sessions be more frequent at the onset 
of treatment and fade as the client improves? Should a 
nboostern session 3 months after treatment termination be 
built into the design? These questions remain to be 
answered before thought constraint can be applied 
clinically. 
In addition, several recent studies have investigated 
the effect of individual differences on self generated 
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attitude change and the attenuation of polarized attitude 
(Leone, 19891 Leone & Ensley, 1986). For example, 
Richardson (1977) has demonstrated that some people think 
visually while others think verbally. Leone and Aronow 
(research in progress) are studying the response of subjects 
designated visualizers and those designated verbalizers to 
process constraint. They hypothesize that verbalizers 
should respond better to the essentially verbal process 
constraint treatment analogue than should visualizers. 
In summary, thought constraint appears to be effective 
in attuenuating fear producing self-generated attitude 
change. While other explanations may seem possible, 
self-generated attitude change is the most plausible. 
Additional work is currently in progress to develop the 
optimal thought constraint therapeutic protocol-for treating 
simple phobia. 
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Footnotes 
IThe author wishes to thank Brett Cantrell, M.D., 
Robert Groble, M.D., and Evan Erskine, M.A.Ch.Eng., who 
prepared the solution and paper for the palmar sweat 
measure. 
2A procedural error was made in measuring palmar 
sweat during the relaxation exercise rather than 
immediately following the exercise. Therefore, the 
palmer sweat measures taken during the relaxation 
procedure were not analyzed. 
Table 1 
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Mean Behavioral Approach by Treatment Analogue and 
Pretest-Posttest 
Treatment Analogue Pretest Means Posttest Means 
Process Constraint 4.27 3.67 
Reality Constraint 5.67 3.53 
Combined Constraint 4.21 3.21 
Note: Smaller numbers indicate closer approach. 
Table 2 
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Mean Physiological Arousal by Treatment Analogue and 
Pretest-Posttest 
Treatment Analogue 
Process Constraint 
Reality Constraint 
Combined Constraint 
Pretest Mean 
3.17 
2.37 
3.86 
Posttest Mean 
2.83 
3.03 
3.14 
Note: Smaller numbers indicate fainter stain (i.e., 
less arousal). 
Table 3 
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Mean Self-Reported Fear by Treatment Analogue and 
pretest-Posttest 
Treatment Analogue 
Process Constraint 
Reality Constraint 
Combined Constraint 
Pretest Mean Posttest Mean 
40.07 31.06 
44.40 25.40 
39.29 25.00 
Note: Smaller numbers indicate less fear. 
Table 4 
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Mean Self-Reported Performance Evaluation by Treatment 
Analogue and Pretest-Posttest 
Treatment Analogue 
Process Constraint 
Reality Constraint 
Combined Constraint 
Pretest Mean 
21.67 
20.80 
21.79 
Posttest Mean 
22.07 
24.07 
24.71 
Note: Lower numbers indicate more negative evaluation. 
Table 5 
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Mean Self-Report of Extralaboratory Coping Expectation 
by Treatment Analogue and Pretest-Posttest 
Treatment Analogue 
Process Constraint 
Reality Constraint 
Combined Constraint 
Pretest Mean 
224.87 
233.13 
204.64 
Posttest Mean 
262.87 
272.87 
268.57 
Note: Higher numbers indicate stronger prediction of 
ability to cope. 
thought constraint comparisons 
Appendix A 
For each itemon this survey, 
the amount o~ Fear that you 
situation. Put your answers 
None 1 
Very Li tt Ie 2 
A Little 3 
'Some 4 
Much 5 
Very Much 6 
Terror 7 
circle thenumber that best 
typically feel toward the 
directly on this page. 
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indiCAtes 
object or 
***************************************************************** 
1. Sharp objects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Worms 
3. Rats and mice 
4. Hypodermic needles 
S. Meeting with_someone for 
the first time 
6. Being alone 
7. Crowded places 
s. Blood 
9. Heights 
10. Meeting authority 
11. Closed places 
12. Boating 
13. Spiders 
14. Snakes 
15. Cemeteries 
16. Spe~king before a group 
17. Seeing a fight 
lB. Dark places 
19. Strange dogs 
20. Being with. member of the 
opposite sex 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6· 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
3' 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
Appendix B 
CONSENT 
I , 
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-freely and 
voluntarily and without undue inducement or any element bi
-force, fraud, deceit, duress,· or other form of constrain~ or 
coercion, consent to be a participant in the research 
project entitled student fears, to be conducted at the
Department of Psy~hology, University of North florida, with 
Dr. Christopher Leone as director of the masters thesis 
research o-f Martha L. Grdble. The procequres to be followed 
and their purposes include, an assessment of fears by 
physiological, behavioral and self report measures, and an 
exercise designed to rel ieve my fears. Any benefits 
rea.sonabl y to be expec ted -from my par tic i pat i on and any 
alternative procedures that migh~ be advantage~us have b~en 
expl~ined. I understand that this consent and data may be 
withdr~wn at any time without prejudice. I have been given 
the r i gh t to asl< and have answered any quest ions. . I have 
read and understarid the foregoing. 
Date Research Participant 
Date Exper imen hr
Appendix C 
BEHAVORIALAPPROACH SCORING CRITERIA 
22 refuse to open door 
21 open door but refuse to enter room 
20 within 15 feet of cage 
19 within 14 feet of cage 
18 within 13 feet of cage 
17 within 12 feet of cage 
16· within 11 feet of cage 
15 within 10 feet of cage 
14 within 9 feet of cage 
13 within 8 feet of cage 
12 within 7 feet of· cage 
11 within 6 feet·of cage 
10 within 5 feet of cage 
9 within 4 feet of cage 
8 within 3 feet of cage 
7 within 2 feet of cage· 
6 within 1 foot of cage 
5 look in cage 
4 touch. cage 
3 put han~ in cage 
2 touch rat 
1 pick up rat 
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Appendix D Subject * ______ _ 
Part 1 
On the following scale, indicate (by circling the number) how 
much fear you experienced while you were in the room with the 
rat. 
No Fear Slight Fear Moderate Fear Strong Fear Terror 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~o ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 90 95 100 
/-----------------------------------------------------------/ 
Part 2 
2. Now indicate what you thought about your behavior (i.e., how 
well you were able to approach the rat) by placing an X in the 
corresponding blank. 
a. Good Bad 
b. Worthless __ Valuable 
c. Pleasant Unpleazant 
d. Positive Negative 
e. Nice Awful 
Part 3 
3. This last set of questions will portray possible encounters 
with rats. Indicate how you believe you would cope with the 
following situations by circling the number. 
a. Visiting an exhibit in a museum that featured rodents from 
around the world. 
Unable 
to cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope 
Able to cope 
pretty well 
Completely 
able 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/----------------------------------------------------- ---------i 
b. While cleaning out your garage, you find a live rat. 
Unable 
to cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope 
Able to cope 
pr.etty well 
Completely 
able 
1 5 10 15 ·20 25-30 35 ~O ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/---------------------~----------------------------------------/ 
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c. A friend goes on vacation and asks you to care for their pet 
rat. 
Unable 
to cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope 
Able to cope 
pretty well 
Completely 
able 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~O ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/---------------------------------------------~---------------/ 
d. Watching a film on the environment and habits of rats in 
Florida. 
Unable 
to.cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope 
Able to cope 
pretty well 
Completely 
able 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~O ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/---~-~--------------------------------------------------------/ 
e. A friend is s.hopping for a pet rat in a pet store. and offers 
to let you hold a rat. 
Unable 
to cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope 
Able to cope 
pretty well 
Completely 
.able 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~O ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/---------------~------------------------------~-~------------/ 
f. Hiking in the mountains and a rat appears on the trail. 
Unable 
to cope 
Barely able 
to cope 
Moderately 
able to cope. 
Able to cope Completely 
pretty well able 
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 ~O ~5 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
/-------------------------------------------------------------/ 
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